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S T E V E N  C .  S A L O P  
Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement 
abstract.  This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be 
invigorated. In our modern market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity. 
Strong enforcement is particularly important in markets where economies of scale and network 
effects lead to barriers to entry and durable market power. Even when there are parallel vertical 
mergers, the result may well be an anticompetitive reciprocal dealing, coordinated equilibrium 
rather than intense competition among efficient integrated ﬁrms. Stronger enforcement would 
involve several steps, including recognition that claims of elimination of double marginalization 
do not deserve to be silver bullets and that behavioral remedies are generally unable to prevent 
anticompetitive effects. 
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and government agencies, including some of the matters discussed here. All opinions are my own 
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introduction 
Chicago School economics and laissez-faire ideology have intentionally tar-
geted vertical merger enforcement. This assault has been largely successful. En-
forcement has been infrequent, and remedies have been limited. However, in our 
modern market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity, par-
ticularly in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers 
to entry and durable market power. This Feature explains why and how vertical 
merger enforcement should be invigorated. This would involve a more balanced 
approach to the evaluation of potential competitive harms and beneﬁts, rather 
than presuming that efficiency beneﬁts are highly likely while competitive harms 
are unlikely or speculative. 
Vertical merger enforcement was attacked as economically irrational by Chi-
cago School commentators, notably by Robert Bork, on three principal 
grounds.
1
 First, while a competitive concern of vertical mergers is that they will 
lead to rivals being “foreclosed” from inputs or customers, leading to market 
power by the merged ﬁrm, Bork argued that the alleged foreclosure was illusory, 
seeing instead merely a neutral rearrangement of supplier-customer relations.
2
 
Second, Bork viewed competitive harm as implausible because there was only a 
“single monopoly proﬁt” that would be unaffected by the merger (except under 
rare circumstances).
3
 Third, Bork offered the affirmative argument that vertical 
mergers were invariably highly efficient: for example, they inevitably reduce 
downstream prices by “eliminating double marginalization” of the cost of the 
upstream merging ﬁrm on sales by the downstream merging ﬁrm.
4
 In sum, for 
these commentators, competitive harm was seen as implausible, and substantial 
competitive beneﬁts were seen as virtually inevitable. It followed from this logic 
that there should be a nearly conclusive presumption that vertical mergers are 
procompetitive, regardless of the market shares of the merging ﬁrms in their re-
spective markets. The spirit (although not the letter) of these critiques was re-
ﬂected in the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which set out narrow 




1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225-45 (1978); see 
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 176-211 (1976). In the second edition of his treatise, 
Judge Richard Posner modiﬁed some of his conclusions, notably with respect to exclusionary 
conduct in “new economy” markets. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 193-256 (2d ed. 
2001) [hereinafter POSNER 2d ed.]. 
2. BORK, supra note 1, at 232. 
3. Id. at 229. 
4. Id. at 226-27. 
5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), http://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [http://perma.cc/6B5Q-UJCH]. 
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This Feature disputes the Chicago School account outlined above and ex-
plains instead that some (but not all) vertical mergers raise substantial compet-
itive concerns. This analysis proceeds in three Parts: Part I reviews the history 
and explains the economic ﬂaws in the Chicago School theories. Part II presents 
a more balanced approach to the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. 
Part III outlines the next steps that might be taken to modernize enforcement 
policy and the law. 
i .  the limited economic relevance of three chicago 
school assumptions underlying the vertical 
enforcement landscape 
A major consequence of the Chicago School commentators’ ﬂawed economic 
theories with respect to vertical merger enforcement is that this body of law has 
remained undeveloped for the past forty years. Consider the following data 
points: The last vertical merger case analyzed by the Supreme Court was the 1972 
merger between Ford and Autolite.
6
 There has been very little private litigation.
7
 
The last vertical merger case litigated to conclusion by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) dates back to 1979, which the FTC lost because it was unable to 
prove probable anticompetitive effects.
8
 Since that time, vertical merger chal-
lenges have been infrequent.
9
 From 1994 to 2016, U.S. agencies have challenged 
only ﬁfty-two mergers that involved vertical integration, and some of these also 
involved horizontal overlaps.
10
 In merger enforcement involving mergers with 
 
6. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
7. Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th 
Cir. 2015), also involved a private challenge that raised vertical-foreclosure concerns. While 
the District Court for the District of Idaho and the Ninth Circuit focused solely on the hori-
zontal overlap, the factual ﬁndings were supportive of the vertical-foreclosure claim. See 
Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger Law: A 
Guide To Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
199, 211 n.52, 221-22 (2016). For two other private cases, see HTI Health Services, Inc. v. 
Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997); and O’Neill v. Coca-Cola Co., 
669 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ill. 1987). In the latter case, the plaintiff was denied standing, and the 
claims were dismissed. 669 F. Supp. at 226. For further discussion of HTI Health Services, see 
Greaney & Ross, supra, at 219-21. 
8. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). The court concluded that it was necessary 
to show “some probable anticompetitive impact” for liability under Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, not simply foreclosure. Id. at 352-53. 
9. Paul Yde, Non-Horizontal Merger Challenges: A Solution in Search of a Problem, ANTITRUST, Fall 
2007, at 74, 77 (noting that enforcement actions in the United States are relatively rare). 
10. See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994-2016 
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., June 30, 2017) [hereinafter Salop & Culley, Enforcement Actions], 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2541&context=facpub 
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both vertical and horizontal components, the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) typically focused only on the horizontal overlaps.
11
 
Within this general dearth of litigation, some more speciﬁc trends can be 
observed. Enforcement has varied across administrations.
12
 Reduced enforce-
ment by the Bush Administration was consistent with its more minimal concerns 
about exclusionary conduct, as reﬂected in the DOJ’s Section 2 report.
13
 That 
report was withdrawn by the Obama DOJ in 2009,
14
 which showed increased 
interest in vertical merger concerns.
15
 While perhaps unexpected, the Trump 
DOJ issued a complaint in November 2017 to block the proposed AT&T-Time 
Warner vertical merger. This merger raised similar concerns as the Comcast-
NBC Universal (NBCU) merger, but unlike in that matter, the DOJ apparently 
 
[http://perma.cc/4HVF-LEAD]. These counts update the earlier enforcement statistics cited 
in Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues 
and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
Salop & Culley, Interim Guide]. These statistics reﬂect only challenges and clear abandon-
ments in response to concerns. For more analysis, see James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, 
Getting Vertical Deals Through the Agencies: “Let’s Make a Deal,” ANTITRUST, Summer 2015, at 
10. 
11. For example, in the recent St. Luke’s merger case, the FTC focused on the horizontal overlap 
in the market for primary physicians, rather than on the vertical merger aspect of the deal, 
which involved combining a physicians’ group with a hospital. See St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775. 
12. Salop & Culley, Enforcement Actions, supra note 10. The DOJ and the FTC brought about 
thirty-three challenges during the Clinton Administration, including three that were ﬁnalized 
in 2001. The George W. Bush Administration initiated ﬁve challenges, and the Obama Ad-
ministration had fourteen actual and threatened enforcement actions. The Obama Admin-
istration threatened actions against the Comcast-Time Warner and Lam-KLA transactions, 
which were abandoned in 2016. The Comcast-Time Warner transaction was analyzed as the 
mix of a horizontal and complementary product combination. In News Corp’s acquisition of 
a stake in the parent company of DIRECTV in 2003, and in AT&T’s acquisition of DIRECTV 
in 2015, the DOJ did not take enforcement action in reliance on the FCC’s remedy. See AT&T 
Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 9131 (2015); General Motors Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 473 (2004). These latter 
two media mergers are not included in the enforcement statistics. 
13. See Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CTL8-FA6H]; see also Note by the United States for OECD Roundtable on Vertical Mer-
gers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Note by the United States], http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-other-international 
-competition-fora/07RoundtableonVerticalMergers.pdf [http://perma.cc/N264-J74W]. 
14. Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May  
11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust 
-monopoly-law [http://perma.cc/GKV6-5UHA]. 
15. See Jon Sallet, Deputy Att’y Gen. for Litig., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Interest-
ing Case of the Vertical Merger (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ﬁle
/938236/download [http://perma.cc/4GNA-TBGF]. 
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refused to accept a proffered conduct remedy.
16
 The outcome of the trial and 
whether the current DOJ and FTC will continue to follow this course of in-
creased enforcement remain open questions at the time of this writing. 
This increase in vertical merger enforcement during the Obama Administra-
tion and the AT&T-Time Warner complaint are encouraging because the Chi-
cago School’s skepticism toward both the competitive risks of vertical mergers 
and foreclosure more generally has proved to be misguided. That skepticism 
rests on three main claims: (1) foreclosure is illusory because vertical mergers 
simply realign vertical relationships rather than reduce supply; (2) anticompeti-
tive foreclosure generally would not be proﬁtable; and (3) vertical mergers are 
invariably efficient, particularly because of elimination of double marginaliza-
tion. However, modern economic analysis demonstrates that these theories do 
not provide a valid basis for such limited enforcement. Instead, modern analysis 
shows that competitive harm can in fact result from vertical mergers when mar-
kets are imperfectly competitive.
17
 As discussed in the next Sections, the ﬁrst two 
claims never had a strong economic basis and have been steadily and powerfully 
debunked by economists, while the third cannot carry the burden to support 
nonenforcement. 
A. Foreclosure as Illusory 
Most fundamentally, Bork argued that vertical mergers do not foreclose, but 
rather realign, vertical relationships. Brown Shoe is a much studied and much 
maligned vertical and horizontal merger ruling by the Supreme Court, address-
ing the Brown Shoe Company’s attempted purchase of G.R. Kinney Company, 
another shoe manufacturer and retailer.
18
  Applied to that case, the Chicago 
 
16. Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:17-cv-02511 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinaf-
ter  AT&T Complaint], http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/1012916/download 
[http://perma.cc/SLF3-TLJY]. 
17. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 
(2013); Jeffrey Church, Vertical Mergers, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1455 
(2008); Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 
80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2145 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007); 
Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 145 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evalu-
ating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael Salin-
ger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988); David T. Scheffman & 
Richard S. Higgins, Vertical Mergers: Theory and Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967 (2004). 
Many of these articles also discuss potential efficiency beneﬁts of vertical mergers and reasons 
why harms may not occur. 
18. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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School critique is that while the Brown Shoe Company may supply more of the 
shoes that it produces to Kinney stores and fewer to competing stores, Kinney 
may purchase fewer shoes from rival manufacturers but more from Brown. Ra-
ther than eliminating rivals’ opportunities, the retailers no longer buying from 
Brown can beneﬁt from the manufacturers no longer selling to Kinney. Thus, 
there is not real foreclosure. This reasoning famously led Bork to quip about a 
later case that the FTC should have hosted an “industry social mixer” instead of 
challenging the merger.
19 
While this criticism may have been applicable to Brown Shoe—where Brown 
and Kinney had very low market shares in unconcentrated markets—it is not true 
in dominant firm or oligopoly markets with entry impediments.
20
 For example, 
suppose that Brown was one of only three large shoe manufacturers selling differ-
entiated products and Kinney had a substantial retail market share. If Brown were 
to raise prices or refuse to sell to Kinney’s downstream rivals, that foreclosure may 
reduce the total supply available to rivals. It also may incentivize Brown’s two man-
ufacturing competitors to raise their prices to Kinney’s rivals in response, either 
unilaterally or through coordinated interaction. Unintegrated downstream rivals 
thus can be disadvantaged, and the merging firm can achieve or enhance market 
power in one or both markets. This explains why foreclosure is real. 
In the proposed AT&T-Time Warner merger, for example, a foreclosure con-
cern is that the merged firm will raise prices of Time Warner content to AT&T’s 
rival video distributors or threaten to withhold that content in order to obtain 
higher prices. Because video content is not fungible, the concern is that the other 
distributors cannot simply drop Time Warner content and replace it with other 
programming without losing some subscribers to AT&T and others. Nor is entry 
of equally popular competing programming easy. Similar foreclosure issues arose 
in the Comcast-NBCU merger.
21
 Moreover, the foreclosure concern is now en-
hanced because Comcast and AT&T would have similar foreclosure incentives and 
might coordinate their actions. Thus, foreclosure concerns cannot simply be dis-
missed in oligopoly markets. Instead, a rational vertical merger policy would ana-
lyze the likely ability and incentives of the merging firms to engage in various types 
of foreclosure conduct. 
 
19. BORK, supra note 1, at 232; see also Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[A] vertical merger may simply realign sales patterns.”). 
20. For simple models of scenarios in which foreclosure is not illusory, see Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
21. See infra text accompanying note 36. 
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B. Single Monopoly Proﬁt 
A second core Chicago School claim is that an unregulated monopolist can 
obtain only a single monopoly proﬁt, so it would gain no additional market 
power from foreclosure through tying or vertical merger.
22
  This theory has 
gained some judicial acceptance. In her Jefferson Parish concurrence advocating 
elimination of the per se rule against tying, Justice O’Connor opined that 
“[c]ounterintuitive though [the single monopoly proﬁt theory] may seem, it is 
easily demonstrated and widely accepted.”
23
 In Jefferson Parish, it was alleged that 
East Jefferson Hospital would force patients solely to use the Roux anesthesiol-
ogy group, and this tying arrangement would harm consumers and competition 
in the local anesthesiology services market. But the single monopoly proﬁt the-
ory would claim that even if the hospital had market power in its hospital mar-
ket, it had no anticompetitive incentive to leverage that power into the anesthe-
siology market.
24
 It would gain no incremental market power or proﬁts by doing 
so. 
Similarly, in Doman, a Second Circuit panel (including then-Judge So-
tomayor) alluded to the theory in dismissing a complaint against an exclusive 
distributorship awarded by a lumber supplier (Doman) to a distributor (Sher-
wood).
25
 The court noted that 
an exclusive distributorship would be counterproductive so far as any 
monopolization goal of Doman is concerned . . . . The power to restrict 
output to maximize proﬁts is complete in the manufacturing monopoly, 
and there is no additional monopoly proﬁt to be made by creating a mo-
nopoly in the retail distribution of the product.
26
 
This theory is simple but invalid in all but the following extreme condi-
tions
27
: (i) the upstream merging ﬁrm is an unregulated monopolist, protected 
 
22. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 229; POSNER 2d ed., supra note 1, at 198-99; Ward S. Bowman, 
Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Aaron Director & Ed-
ward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956). The theory 
recognizes an exception if the monopolist is regulated, in which case the merger can be used 
to evade regulation. 
23. Jefferson Par. Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing BORK, 
supra note 1, at 372-74; and Philip Areeda, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 735 (3d ed. 1981)). 
24. Id. (explaining that tying cannot increase a monopolist’s proﬁt). 
25. E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2006). 
26. Id. (citing Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 711 F.2d 295, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1983); and 3 PHILLIP 
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 725b (1978)). 
27. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Anti-
trust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 15-17 (2015) (explaining that ﬁrms can obtain, extend, and 
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by prohibitive entry barriers; (ii) its product is used by downstream ﬁrms in 
ﬁxed proportions with all other inputs; and (iii) the downstream market is per-
fectly competitive. Under these very special conditions, the upstream monopo-
list would gain no additional monopoly proﬁts by acquiring some downstream 
ﬁrms and foreclosing others to leverage market power into the other market.
28
 
But the market conditions under which the theory applies are far too narrow 
to create a procompetitive enforcement or legal presumption. The theory does 
not carry over to the more typical situation where neither merging partner has a 
monopoly protected by prohibitive entry barriers. If the merging ﬁrms face ac-
tual or potential competition, their merger can maintain, achieve, or enhance 
market power. 
Consider one simple counterexample in which each merging ﬁrm is the mo-
nopoly producer in its market. But suppose that each faces the threat of potential 
competition solely from the other. Absent the merger, each would have the in-
centive to enter the other’s market (or partner with an entrant) in order to in-
crease competition there and allow it to charge a higher price in its own market 
as demand increases. The vertical merger would extinguish these incentives and 
thus could preserve the two monopolies, contrary to the single monopoly proﬁt 
theory. If there were other entrants, they would need to enter both markets sim-
ultaneously, which could create increased entry risks and costs which could deter 
entry. Even if entry is not deterred, it may be delayed.
29
 
Additionally, in oligopoly markets with multiple competitors, vertical mer-
gers can harm competition from input or customer foreclosure, even without 
coordination. To illustrate, suppose the dominant hospital acquires a key anes-
thesiology group and the anesthesiology group then stops providing services or 
raises its prices to other, smaller hospitals. This input foreclosure could raise the 
costs of rival hospitals. The cost increases would be supported or enhanced if 
other large competing anesthesiology groups also raise prices in response. These 
higher prices of the critical anesthesiology input would raise the costs of the 
smaller hospitals, thereby permitting the merging hospital to enhance its market 
power. Or, imagine that the dominant hospital stops using other anesthesiolo-
gists, relying instead solely on the acquired group, and that conduct leads some 
smaller competing anesthesiology groups to exit from the market. This customer 
 
maintain market power outside the extreme assumptions required for the theory); Church, 
supra note 17, at 1469, 1472 (same); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of 
the Single Monopoly Proﬁt Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400-01 (2009) (explaining that ab-
sent restrictive assumptions, tying can increase monopoly proﬁts absent efficiencies). 
28. The single monopoly proﬁt theory was tested and rejected for railroad markets. Curtis M. 
Grimm et al., Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago Leverage Theory, 35 J.L. & ECON. 
295 (1992). 
29. Posner focuses primarily on the potential for delay. POSNER 2d ed., supra note 1, at 225. 
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foreclosure could permit the acquired anesthesiology group to gain market 
power over smaller competing hospitals and clinics. Customer foreclosure also 
could lead to input foreclosure effects, allowing the merging hospital to increase 
its prices. In short, the assumption that no additional market power can be 
gained from a vertical merger cannot be sustained.
30
 
C. Efficiency Beneﬁts from Elimination of Double Marginalization 
A third Chicago School claim is that vertical mergers are invariably highly 
efficient. A key driver is the assumption that the downstream merging ﬁrm’s 
price will be reduced from the merger. This claim postulates that the upstream 
ﬁrm will transfer its input at marginal cost instead of the higher premerger price, 
and this elimination of double marginalization (EDM) of the upstream ﬁrm’s 
cost will lead the downstream merger partner to reduce its output price.
31
 The 
Acting Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition recently explained that the 
prospect of EDM was an “intrinsic” efficiency justiﬁcation.
32
 This theory has 
been used as a ubiquitous justiﬁcation for weak enforcement.
33
 
While many vertical mergers, like many horizontal mergers, may entail effi-
ciency beneﬁts, the EDM theory does not prove that vertical mergers are almost 
always procompetitive. Claims that EDM must lead to lower downstream prices 
are overstated for several reasons. First, if the upstream ﬁrm sells to rivals at a 
higher price than charged to the downstream merging ﬁrm, then diverting sales 
 
30. However, in matters where one of the merging ﬁrms is a monopolist, answering the question 
of why power can be maintained or additional power gained in another market can be a useful 
analytical tool. 
31. BORK, supra note 1, at 219; POSNER 2d ed., supra note 1, at 228. For the seminal analysis, see 
Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950). See also 
Gerard Gaudet & Ngo V. Long, Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and Proﬁts in the Presence of 
Double Marginalization, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 409 (1996). Note that there is no EDM 
in the rare situation when the single monopoly proﬁt theory applies. 
32. D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical 
Merger Enforcement at the FTC 3 (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles 
/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_speech_ﬁnal.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/37EH-UDKW]; see also Yde, supra note 9, at 75 (describing the intrinsic 
output-enhancing incentive); Christine Siegwarth Meyer & Yijia (Isabelle) Wang, Determin-
ing the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration in Mergers, ECON. COMMITTEE NEWSL., Spring 
2011, at 8, http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Vertical
_Integration_0511.pdf [http://perma.cc/7MMK-HE3Y] (describing the “most prominent” 
efficiency justiﬁcation). 
33. Indeed, the George W. Bush Administration enforcers argued that the “greater the market 
power (in its respective market) of each party to a vertical merger, the greater the potential 
for their merger to increase efficiency by eliminating the double markup between them.” Note 
by the United States, supra note 13, ¶ 25. 
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to its downstream partner creates an “opportunity cost” resulting from lower 
upstream proﬁts, which mitigates or eliminates the incentive to reduce the 
downstream price.
34
 Second, if the downstream ﬁrm’s price reduction would be 
given to a large number of existing customers relative to the number of new cus-
tomers diverted from ﬁrms that did not buy the upstream ﬁrm’s input, then the 
incentive to cut the downstream price will also be mitigated or eliminated. Third, 
double marginalization may have been totally or partially eliminated in the pre-
merger market by contracts with quantity forcing or “nonlinear” pricing. Fourth, 
EDM would not be merger-speciﬁc if it can be achieved as a practical matter 
absent the merger. Fifth, there is no EDM if the downstream ﬁrm’s technology 
is incompatible with the upstream ﬁrm’s inputs.
35
 Finally, the existence of EDM 
does not prove that the merger is procompetitive. An EDM incentive to reduce 
prices may be dominated by the incentives to raise prices resulting from foreclo-
sure or coordination. Thus, the potential for EDM is not a valid rationale for 
weak or nonexistent enforcement. 
The limitations of EDM are beginning to carry more force. Both the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the DOJ were skeptical of the EDM 
claims in the Comcast-NBCU merger. The DOJ concluded that “much, if not all, 
of any potential double marginalization is reduced, if not completely eliminated, 
through the course of contract negotiations.”
36
 The FCC also noted the oppor-
tunity cost concern and concluded that the EDM claims were both overstated 
and not merger speciﬁc.
37
 
D. Modern Incentives Analysis, Error Costs, and Presumptions 
The implication of the Chicago School analysis is that vertical mergers are 
almost always procompetitive and are entitled to a strong legal presumption in 
 
34. This opportunity cost issue was mentioned in passing by Bork, but only in the context of 
perfect competition in the downstream market, and it did not affect his policy recommenda-
tions. BORK, supra note 1, at 228. 
35. Enghin Atalay et al., Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1120, 1127 (2014) 
(ﬁnding that almost half of establishments report no internal shipments). 
36. Competitive Impact Statement at 30, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d. 145 
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00106) [hereinafter Comcast-NBCU CIS], http://www.justice
.gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/492251/download [http://perma.cc/LE6C-U37X]. 
37. Comcast Corp., 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4335 (2011). For further economic analysis, see William P. 
Rogerson, A Vertical Merger in the Video Programming and Distribution Industry: Comcast-
NBCU (2011), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 534 
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014). 
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order to avoid false positive errors and overdeterrence.
38
 Because of the short-
comings of these theories, they do not validly support weak enforcement or 
highly permissible legal standards.
39
 A balanced enforcement policy and law in-
stead would recognize that vertical mergers can lead to competitive harms as well 
as competitive beneﬁts. It would also recognize that efficiency beneﬁts are nei-
ther invariably merger-speciﬁc nor invariably sufficient to prevent anticompeti-
tive effects. 
Some proponents of the outdated Chicago School approach contrast vertical 
and horizontal mergers, arguing there are intrinsic competitive concerns in hor-
izontal mergers.
40
 They then argue that vertical mergers are the opposite, with 
intrinsic EDM efficiency beneﬁts and highly unlikely competitive harms.
41
 How-
ever, these contrasting presumptions do not hold up to careful analysis. For the 
type of markets that are normally analyzed in antitrust, the competitive harms 
from vertical mergers are just as intrinsic as are harms from horizontal mergers. 
While vertical mergers have intrinsic beneﬁts from cooperation, so do horizontal 
 
38. False positive errors involve judicial ﬁndings of liability where the conduct actually is procom-
petitive or involve overdeterrence more generally. False negatives errors are the opposite, ﬁnd-
ing no liability for anticompetitive conduct and reﬂecting underdeterrence more generally. 
39. The issue is not whether all or most vertical mergers are anticompetitive, but whether some 
are, and whether enforcers and courts informed with evidence can tell the difference. Three 
classic examples of a vertically integrated ﬁrm engaging in foreclosure conduct are: vertically 
integrated AT&T using its control over the local exchange network to raise barriers to entry 
into long distance, conduct that resulted in the disintegration of AT&T, United States v. AT&T 
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff ’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
(1983); Microsoft engaging in foreclosure conduct towards Netscape in order to raise barriers 
to entry into desktop operating systems, leading to Section 2 liability, United States v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); and Verizon delaying access to DSL competitors 
in violation of FCC regulations in order to maintain its market power in that market, though 
Verizon escaped liability on other grounds, Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
40. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 2-3. 
41. Id.; see also Yde, supra note 9, at 74-75. Yde’s view appears to be premised on the fact that the 
upstream and downstream markets are both either perfectly competitive, or at least one mar-
ket is perfectly monopolistic, and protected by prohibitive entry barriers. In these extreme 
cases, vertical mergers will not have foreclosure effects but may have EDM beneﬁts in the 
monopoly case. Yde, supra note 9, at 75. Yde uses these polar cases to recommend a very cau-
tious policy. Id. However, his analysis does not apply to imperfectly competitive markets not 
at these two polar extremes. 




 Downward pricing pressure from EDM and other sources is not in-




Consider ﬁrst the well-understood and accepted notion that there is inherent 
upward pricing pressure from horizontal mergers in differentiated products 
markets, even without coordination.
44
 In fact, the same inherent upward pricing 
pressure occurs for vertical mergers in similar market structures.
45
 An upstream 
merging ﬁrm that is not an unregulated monopolist protected by prohibitive en-
try barriers has a similar intrinsic incentive to engage in input foreclosure by 
raising the input price it charges to the rivals of its downstream merger partner. 
A higher input price has an intrinsic upward effect on the rivals’ prices, which 
permits the downstream merging ﬁrm to raise its price.
46
 While this upward 
pricing pressure may be mitigated or deterred by sufficient upstream competi-
tion, repositioning, or anticipated entry (just as it can be in horizontal mergers), 
and by sufficient downstream competition by nonforeclosed ﬁrms, the pricing 
pressure is an intrinsic incentive. Moreover, the likelihood of price increases is 
enhanced if other upstream or downstream competitors raise their prices in re-
sponse to the price increase by the integrated ﬁrm, whether unilaterally or in a 
coordinated fashion, just as for horizontal mergers.
47
 
At the same time, absent EDM, there also is an intrinsic incentive in vertical 
mergers to raise the price of the downstream merging ﬁrm as a way to drive 
additional sales to its upstream merger partner.
48
 EDM and other efficiencies can 
 
42. As stated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, “a primary beneﬁt of mergers to the economy 
is their potential to generate signiﬁcant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged ﬁrm’s ability 
and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced ser-
vice, or new products.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES  29 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/attachments/merger-review
/100819hmg.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FJX-DEN6]. 
43. See, e.g., John Stuckey & David White, When and When Not To Vertically Integrate, MCKINSEY 
Q. (1993), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-ﬁnance
/our-insights/when-and-when-not-to-vertically-integrate [http://perma.cc/G48C-P6UC]. 
44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 42, at 20-21; Yde, supra note 9, at 74. 
45. These incentives are intuitive on the basis of standard microeconomic analysis of ﬁrms pro-
ducing differentiated products. For a formal treatment of these incentives, see Serge Moresi 
& Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 185 (2013). 
46. Id. at 193-96. 
47. Salop & Culley, Interim Guide, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that rival upstream ﬁrms may raise 
prices unilaterally or in coordination). 
48. Moresi & Salop, supra note 45, at 198. 
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mitigate or even reverse this upward inherent pricing incentive for the down-
stream merging ﬁrm, just as efficiencies do for horizontal mergers.
49
 However, 
reversing the upward pricing incentive of this merger partner and instead caus-
ing downward pricing pressure is not inevitable for the reasons discussed above. 
Moreover, even if EDM or other efficiencies do create downward pricing pres-
sure, that downward pressure does not necessarily dominate the upward pricing 
pressure from the incentive of the upstream merging ﬁrm to raise its input price 
to rivals. 
In short, in the real world of imperfectly competitive markets, the direction 
of the net competitive effect is a question of fact, not theory. While vertical mer-
gers in oligopoly markets should not be subject to near-per se illegality, they also 
are not entitled to near-per se legality. Both of these per se rules would lead to 
unacceptable errors. Instead, competitive-effects analysis, enforcement, and law 
should be balanced and fact-based. 
i i .  a more balanced view of the competitive harms and 
benefits from vertical mergers 
This Part offers a more balanced account of the harms and beneﬁts associated 
with vertical mergers. Merger analysis under Section 7 focuses on whether the 
merger may have a signiﬁcant likelihood of substantially lessening competi-
tion.
50
 For vertical mergers, this involves analysis of the relative likelihood and 
magnitude of competitive beneﬁts and harms.
51
 In light of the “incipiency” lan-
guage of Section 7, the burden on the plaintiff to show likely anticompetitive 
effects on balance is reduced.
52




49. Id. at 199. 
50. A merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act if the effect of the merger “may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in “any line of commerce . . . in any 
section of the country.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
51. For an overview, see Salop & Culley, Interim Guide, supra note 10. The European Commission 
issued nonhorizontal merger guidelines in 2007. See Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-
Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between 
Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 7 [hereinafter EC Guidelines]. 
52. See infra note 92. 
53. For more skeptical views of the need to invigorate vertical merger analysis, see, for example, 
Michael W. Klass & Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound 
Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (1995); 
Scheffman & Higgins, supra note 17; and Yde, supra note 9. 
invigorating vertical merger enforcement 
1975 
A. Competitive Harms 
The potential competitive harms from vertical mergers can be classiﬁed in 
various interrelated ways. First, vertical mergers can lead to anticompetitive ef-
fects centered in either the upstream or downstream market.
54
  Second, the 
mechanism of harm can involve unilateral, coordinated, or exclusionary effects, 
or a combination. Third, the merger can lead the merged ﬁrm to achieve, en-
hance, or maintain monopoly or market power. Fourth, vertical mergers also can 
facilitate the harmful exercise of preexisting market power, such as when they 
permit evasion of price regulation. Fifth, the adverse competitive effects can in-
volve higher prices, lower product quality, or reduced investment and innovation 
that otherwise would occur absent the merger. 
The primary competitive mechanism involves exclusion, though the exclu-
sion can also operate to facilitate or support coordination. This can entail input 
foreclosure, customer foreclosure, or both. The paradigmatic input foreclosure 
concern entails the upstream merging ﬁrm raising prices or refusing to sell its 
critical input to one or more actual or potential rivals of the downstream merging 
ﬁrm.
55
 For example, in Comcast-NBCU, an input foreclosure concern was that 
the ﬁrm would raise the price of NBCU programming or possibly withhold it 
from video competitors, including online video distributors (OVDs).
56
  The 
AT&T-Time Warner complaint alleges that the merged ﬁrm will gain the power 
to raise the price of Time Warner programming.
57
 Where the upstream market 
has differentiated products or lacks sufficient competition, or where the foreclo-
sure facilitates upstream coordination in a concentrated market, foreclosure can 
raise competitors’ costs and lead them to reduce output and raise prices, as well 
as raise barriers to entry.
58
 As a result, the downstream merging ﬁrm may gain 
power to raise or maintain price to the detriment of consumers and competition. 
This exercise of market power may be unilateral or involve coordination with 
other nonforeclosed downstream ﬁrms, where the input foreclosure reduces the 
ability of the foreclosed downstream ﬁrms to disrupt the coordination. 
 
54. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17; see also sources cited infra note 72. 
55. This input foreclosure paradigm also applies to mergers between manufacturers and distrib-
utors, since distributors provide a distribution input that is required to market a product. For 
a general analysis of foreclosure, see Steven C. Salop, The Raising Rivals’ Cost Foreclosure Par-
adigm, Conditional Pricing Practices and the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, 81 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 371, 382-95 (2017). 
56. Comcast-NBCU CIS, supra note 36, at 14. 
57. AT&T Complaint, supra note 16, at 3. 
58. For analysis of these issues and types of relevant evidence, see, for example, Salop & Culley, 
Interim Guide, supra note 10, at 18; and Riordan & Salop, supra note 17, at 528-41. See also 
sources cited supra note 17. 
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Customer foreclosure involves the downstream merging ﬁrm reducing or 
ceasing purchases from actual or potential rivals of the upstream merging ﬁrm. 
This foreclosure can lead to one or more upstream suppliers exiting or reducing 
investment, thereby permitting the upstream merging ﬁrm to exercise market 
power. In the Comcast-Time Warner Cable proposed merger, one concern was 
that an OVD’s failure to obtain distribution on either Comcast or Time Warner 
Cable would reduce its likelihood of survival. This lack of entry could increase 
the market power of the cable distributors.
59
 
Foreclosed rivals may be actual or potential competitors. Where potential 
competitors are foreclosed, the exclusionary conduct can be seen as raising bar-
riers to entry and reducing innovation. In the extreme case where one or both of 
the merging ﬁrms is a monopolist, the foreclosure can force entrants to enter 




A vertical merger also can eliminate the most likely potential entrant. The 
LiveNation-Ticketmaster
61
 merger provides a useful illustration. Both merging 
ﬁrms had substantial market power in their respective markets—large concert 
venues and ticketing services, respectively. LiveNation was entering the ticketing 
market but then merged with Ticketmaster. While the DOJ consent decree re-
quired divestiture of ticketing technologies, the ticketing market lost its most 
powerful future competitor. First, LiveNation could offer ticketing services for 
its own events to achieve minimum viable scale. Second, as a complementary 
product provider, it had substantial incentives to enter to disrupt Ticketmaster’s 
market power, as outlined in the earlier discussion of the single monopoly proﬁt 
 
59. For one analysis, see William P. Rogerson, Economic Theories of Harm Raised by the Proposed 
Comcast/TWC Transaction (2015), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETI-
TION, AND POLICY (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 7th ed. forthcoming 2018). 
The result of this threat to their survival raised the bargaining power of the merging ﬁrms, 
which could permit them to charge higher interconnection prices, which then raises the costs 
of the OVDs. In this way, it can lead to input foreclosure effects. 
60. Salop & Culley, Interim Guide, supra note 10, at 16 (explaining that the need for two-level 
entry can reduce the likelihood of entry). Posner suggests that the need for two-level entry 
generally would at most delay entry, unless it created a risk premium. POSNER 2d ed., supra 
note 1, at 225. Even if entry is only delayed, delays can create substantial consumer harm dur-
ing the interim. In addition, the higher sunk costs of two-level entry along with the fear of 
post-entry competition, and potential reduced ability to enter secretly, can deter entry perma-
nently. Delays also can become permanent if there is only a narrow window of opportunity 
for new entrants. See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 76 (3d ed. 
2011). 
61. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00139 
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254544.htm [http://perma
.cc/9DN3-V8TX]. 




  Thus, it was both economically rational and likely inevitable for 
LiveNation to continue to invest in its ticketing venture until it succeeded. By 
merging, the market lost LiveNation as a powerful entrant into ticketing.
63
 
Foreclosure also can facilitate anticompetitive coordination in the upstream 
or downstream markets. When there are multiple vertically integrated ﬁrms, 
they have an increased ability and incentive to engage in input foreclosure 
against their unintegrated rivals.
64
 If there are multiple vertical mergers, perhaps 
in response to one another, the outcome may lead to a broad anticompetitive 
reciprocal dealing, coordination effects equilibrium with higher consumer 
prices. Barriers to entry also might rise from rivals facing higher costs.
65
 
This anticompetitive reciprocal dealing, coordination effects outcome could 
be the end game from a series of parallel vertical mergers where no one ﬁrm 
achieves dominance.
66
 To illustrate with a hypothetical example suggested by the 
AT&T-Time Warner merger, suppose there initially were three competing, dif-
ferentiated video content providers and three competing, differentiated video 
distributors, and consumers economically purchase from only a single distribu-
tor. Suppose that all three content providers initially supply all three distributors. 
Suppose next that there are three parallel vertical mergers of the distributors and 
content providers. These three now-integrated ﬁrms might well be able to facil-
itate credible coordination among themselves with reciprocal contracts charging 
each other high input prices, perhaps also supported with Most-Favored-Nation 




62. See supra Section I.B. 
63. The DOJ remedy required LiveNation to license its nascent ticketing entity to Anschutz in the 
hope of creating a new vertically integrated competitor. Ticketmaster, No. 1:10-cv-00139, 2010 
WL 5699134, at *4 (July 30, 2010). 
64. C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1186 (2013). 
65. Id. at 1236-40 (arguing that ﬁrm conduct that blocks would-be market entrants should be 
considered a form of monopolization); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 20, at 246. 
66. For a similar analysis of anticompetitive reciprocal dealing in the context of two-way royalties 
in patent cross-licensing, see Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 25 (1985). For an analysis in the context of standard setting organizations, see A. Douglas 
Melamed & Carl Shapir0, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 
127 YALE L.J. 2110 (2018). 
67. One might ask why this coordination would not occur in the premerger world if MFNs were 
used. Premerger MFNs would be a much weaker facilitating practice. If the three downstream 
distributors had MFNs with upstream content providers, and if those MFNs increased the 
content prices, the beneﬁciaries would be the content providers, not the distributors, so there 
would need to be monitoring of returns and side payments to split up the cartel proﬁts in 
order to induce the distributors to go along. By contrast, after the vertical mergers, the dis-
tributors would be dealing with each other directly, and the reciprocity is a stabilizing force. 
In addition, if one distributor were to defect, it would lose access to two-thirds of the content, 
which would reduce its product quality. 
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this way, they could achieve the equivalent of (or an outcome closer to) the cartel 
outcome in the downstream video subscription market.
68
 The reciprocal dealing 
equilibrium also could lead to barriers to entry into the content market.
69
 Con-
sumer harm is even more likely if the three distributors had been powerful 
enough in the premerger market to negotiate low content prices. 
A version of this anticompetitive reciprocal dealing theory may be an issue in 
the DOJ complaint in the proposed AT&T-Time Warner vertical merger.
70
 The 
complaint alleges that the merger would “make oligopolistic coordination more 
likely” because it “would align the structures of the two largest traditional video 
distributors, who would have the incentive and ability to coordinate to impede 
competition from innovative online rivals and result in higher prices.”
71
 Coordi-
nation concerns would lead to even greater consumer harms if this trend towards 
vertical integration were to continue with subsequent vertical mergers. 
Anticompetitive coordination also can be facilitated in other ways.
72
 If the 
downstream merging ﬁrm had been a disruptive input purchaser that deterred 
input market coordination, the merger might eliminate this incentive. For exam-
ple, if Amazon’s low prices hold down the ability of book publishers to coordi-
nate in pricing to other bookstores, an acquisition by Amazon of a publisher 
might lead Amazon to stop taking actions that disrupt this coordination. In a 
market where the upstream merging ﬁrm has been a maverick seller, whose be-
havior deterred input market coordination, a vertical merger similarly might 
eliminate this incentive and facilitate coordination in selling to rivals of its down-
stream division. Coordination also can be facilitated by one of the merging ﬁrms 
transferring sensitive competitive information to its merger partner, information 
that can be used to facilitate parallel accommodating conduct, interdependent 




68. Alternatively, if each ﬁrm forecloses rival distributors from owned content, then consumers 
would have access to only one-third of the differentiated content, in which case EDM likely 
would not trump the lower product quality. 
69. Each of the three integrated ﬁrms would have a greater unilateral incentive to deter content 
entry, which also could facilitate consciously parallel decisions not to carry the content of new 
entrants. 
70. AT&T Complaint, supra note 16. 
71. Id. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 41. 
72. For technical models, see, for example, Volker Nocke & Lucy White, Do Vertical Mergers Facil-
itate Upstream Collusion?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1321 (2007); Volker Nocke & Lucy White, Vertical 
Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers, 28 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 350 (2010); and Hans-Theo 
Normann, Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion, 53 EUR. ECON. REV. 
461 (2009). 
73. Information transfer alternatively can decrease rivals’ incentives to innovate if the merged ﬁrm 
is able to respond more rapidly or even preemptively as a result of earlier warning. 
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Predicting whether competitive harms from foreclosure likely will occur can 
be aided by quantitative methodologies developed by economists over the last 
two decades. These methodologies can be used in conjunction with natural ex-
periments and other economic and documentary evidence. The quantitative 
methodologies include the vertical arithmetic methodology to gauge whether to-
tal foreclosure (i.e., refusal to deal) would be proﬁtable for the merged ﬁrm, 
while holding prices of the merging and rival ﬁrms constant and abstracting 
from any efficiency effects;
74
 the Nash Bargaining Equilibrium methodology to 
evaluate the impact of foreclosure threats on predicted negotiated prices;
75
 the 
vertical gross upward pricing pressure index (GUPPI) methodology to gauge 
partial foreclosure unilateral incentives to raise input prices to rival downstream 
ﬁrms and the resulting upward pricing pressure on rivals’ prices, as well as 
EDM;
76
 and merger simulation models that incorporate the impact of changed 
incentives of the merging and nonmerging ﬁrms on the postmerger market equi-
librium. 
These quantitative methodologies can be useful. But, while they are framed 
as if they are precise predicted price changes, they are more imprecise indicators 
of the direction and strength of incentives. They may ignore impacts on certain 
prices (e.g., the prices of competing upstream ﬁrms). They do not take into ac-
count all the possible determinants of prices or interactions among the various 
prices. Simulation models attempt to take more factors and interactions into ac-
count. All these quantitative methodologies also are limited because they gener-
ally focus only on a subset of the possible harms that are easiest to quantify with 
available data. They also generally focus only on unilateral effects and ignore the 
potential that the merger will facilitate coordination. These quantitative meth-
odologies can be combined with documentary and other evidence to make a 
 
74. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct Broadcast 
Satellite Assets, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193 (2000); David S. Sibley & Michael J. Doane, Raising 
the Costs of Unintegrated Rivals: An Analysis of Barnes & Noble’s Proposed Acquisition of Ingram 
Book Company, in MEASURING MARKET POWER 211 (Daniel J. Slottje ed., 2002); Steven C. 
Salop et al., An Economic Analysis of Primestar’s Competitive Behavior and Incentives (Jan. 
7, 1998) (FCC Submission) (on ﬁle with author); Steven C. Salop et. al., News Corporation’s 
Partial Acquisition of DIRECTV: Economic Analysis of Vertical Foreclosure Claims (July 1, 2003), 
http://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/ﬁle/6514283359.pdf [http://perma.cc/AN2D-NFKL]. 
75. See Affidavit of William P. Rogerson at 3-4, 16-17, Gen. Motors Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 473 (2004) 
(MB Docket No. 03-124), http://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/ﬁle/6514183175.pdf [http://perma.cc/YP5M 
-HT6X]; see also Jonathan B. Baker et al., The Year in Economics at the FCC, 2010-11: Protecting 
Competition Online, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 297, 304-06 (2011) (describing the application of the 
Nash bargaining model to various transactions); Rogerson, supra note 37 (describing the ap-
plication of the Nash model to the Comcast-NBCU merger). 
76. Moresi & Salop, supra note 45. Other vertical GUPPIs could be derived for different model 
formulations. 
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more reliable prediction of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects from the pro-
posed merger. 
B.  Competitive Beneﬁts 
A vertical merger may generate cognizable efficiency beneﬁts.
77
 These com-
petitive beneﬁts can reverse or deter potential anticompetitive conduct by creat-
ing the ability and incentives to reduce prices, increase quality, expand invest-
ment, or speed innovation. First, like a requirements contract, a vertical merger 
might reduce risk by creating guaranteed demand for an input supplier or guar-
anteed supply for a customer, either of which can lead to lower costs.
78
 For ex-
ample, this could be a rationale for a ﬁrm like Apple acquiring a ﬂash memory 
producer. Second, a vertical merger might “internalize” the spillover beneﬁts 
that investment by one of the ﬁrms has on the proﬁtability of the other, which 
might reduce costs or increase product quality or innovation. An argument along 
these lines might be used to rationalize Amazon’s acquisition of a robot manu-
facturer to complement its investments in automation. Third, a merger might 
also spur investment by reducing the risk of holdup, for example, when a ﬁrm 
that will be investing over time in machines using a developing patented tech-
nology purchases the underlying patents. Fourth, a vertical merger may lead to 
better information sharing or coordination between the upstream and down-
stream ﬁrms, which can increase product quality or reduce costs. Fifth, EDM can 
lead to incentives to reduce prices. The beneﬁts can enhance competition from 
unilateral effects. Or, in markets vulnerable to coordination, a merger might re-
duce the likelihood of coordinated effects by creating a maverick, or it might dis-
rupt oligopoly coordination by decreasing the incentives to coordinate. These var-
ious sources of downward pricing pressure could offset and reverse upward 
pricing pressure from the various sources of potential competitive harms. Of 
course, beneﬁts lost to rivals (e.g., from reduced cooperation) and integration 
costs that would reduce competition also must be taken into account. 
 
77. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK 
OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 319 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); 
Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and Productive Effi-
ciency, 46 RAND J. ECON. 461 (2015); see also sources cited supra note 17 (discussing efficien-
cies). 
78. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949) (describing this 
guarantee as a beneﬁt of requirements contracts); Dennis W. Carlton, Vertical Integration in 
Competitive Markets Under Uncertainty, 27 J. INDUS. ECON. 189, 194 n.5 (1979) (arguing that 
this guarantee is a beneﬁt of vertical integration); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 64, at 1218 
(discussing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), as an example of efficient 
requirements contracts). 
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C. Comparing Competitive Harms and Competitive Beneﬁts 
Determining the likelihood of an anticompetitive merger involves comparing 
the likelihood and magnitude of these competitive beneﬁts and harms to deter-
mine if consumers and competition are injured on balance. As with horizontal 
mergers, only merger-speciﬁc efficiency beneﬁts should be taken into account in 
the balance. As discussed below, the burden on the plaintiff is reduced under 
Section 7.
79
 Because the merging parties have better access to the relevant infor-
mation, they also bear the burden of producing evidence of efficiency beneﬁts, 
just as they do elsewhere in antitrust. 
Foreclosed rivals in principle might be able to engage in responsive vertical 
mergers or de novo backward integration on their own. In that case, if vertical 
integration is efficient, consumers might get the beneﬁt of competition among 
more efficient vertically integrated ﬁrms. This is theoretically possible, particu-
larly where the inputs are homogeneous and there are no barriers to entry. But 
where the inputs are differentiated, even if each downstream ﬁrm integrates with 
an input supplier in response, all of them could end up losing access to the other 
differentiated inputs, which can cause harm despite somewhat lower input costs 
from EDM. This loss of access can be a particular concern in a dynamic, innova-
tive input market, where each of the integrated ﬁrms would have access solely to 
its own input innovations. In addition, the end result could be the anticompeti-
tive reciprocal dealing, coordination effects equilibrium. Thus, one cannot pre-
sume that the beneﬁts of the parallel vertical integration would exceed the 
harms, even if no ﬁrm achieves dominance. 
A vertical merger may increase the downstream merging ﬁrm’s ability to ne-
gotiate lower prices from other (rival) input suppliers because it can threaten to 
turn to its upstream partner. In the Anthem-Cigna horizontal merger, however, 
the court indicated signiﬁcant skepticism whether such “procurement efficien-
cies” actually would beneﬁt consumers, and indeed, it suggested that consumers 
may be harmed on balance.
80
 While increased bargaining leverage might lower 
the costs of the merged ﬁrm, it raises a number of factual issues regarding 
whether it will lead to consumer beneﬁts. The input price decrease might lead to 
lower quality inputs, may take a long time to occur, or may not be passed on to 
consumers. Instead of bargaining for lower prices for itself, the ﬁrm instead may 
bargain for the suppliers to raise the prices they charge its downstream rivals. 
 
79. See infra note 92. 
80. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 231-59 (D.D.C. 2017), aff ’d, 855 F.3d 345 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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This could involve an MFN-plus contractual provision, or it might be more in-
formal.
81
 Or it may lead to the upstream ﬁrms having incentives to raise their 
prices to the other downstream ﬁrms.
82
 Finally, using a merger to increase bar-
gaining power over input suppliers might harm the competitive process by cre-
ating buyer-side market power. 
i i i . next steps 
Invigorating enforcement requires action by both enforcement agencies and 
courts to modernize vertical merger enforcement policy and update vertical mer-
ger law. This involves recognizing the substantial potential harms from vertical 
and complementary product mergers, foregoing strong procompetitive pre-
sumptions in making enforcement decisions, conceding that behavioral reme-
dies are generally insufficient, and thereby requiring divestitures as remedies or 
taking action to block problematic vertical mergers. Enforcement policy changes 
could be summarized in revised vertical merger guidelines and then solidiﬁed in 
court decisions evaluating litigated challenges to anticompetitive mergers. 
Revised guidelines would provide useful guidance to agency and state en-
forcers, outside counsel, potential merging ﬁrms and complaining ﬁrms.
83
 
Guidelines also would provide useful guidance to the courts. The courts have 
shown themselves in recent years to be very skilled in evaluating merger cases, 
and their evaluations have beneﬁted from the analysis and conclusions embed-




81. An MFN-plus provision mandates that the downstream ﬁrm be given a certain discount be-
low the best price offered to others. MFN-plus provisions given to a large customer tend to 
raise the absolute level of prices to the nonfavored customers. See, e.g., United States v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Jonathan B. Baker 
& Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, ANTI-
TRUST, Spring 2013, at 20, 24. 
82. In addition, the lower prices might have customer foreclosure effects in the upstream market 
that might lead to exit of some input suppliers and higher input prices being charged to other 
downstream competitors. 
83. As explained by the court in a private action attacking Coca-Cola’s and PepsiCo’s acquisitions 
of bottlers, “O’Neill [the plaintiff ] does not speciﬁcally allege how higher prices will result 
from these alleged consequences of these vertical acquisitions . . . . Indeed, O’Neill burdens 
this court to provide the causal links.” O’Neill v. Coca-Cola Co. 669 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987). 
84. See, e.g., Anthem, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 195; United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-
WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014); United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 
833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 52 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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The 1984 Non-Horizontal Guidelines are out-of-date.
85
 There was no appe-
tite for revising the Guidelines during the George W. Bush or Obama Admin-
istrations.
86
 However, the current DOJ Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for 
Antitrust, Makan Delrahim, was a member of the Antitrust Modernization Com-
mission (AMC) and joined the AMC recommendation to revise the Guidelines.
87
 
So perhaps the Guidelines will be revised during this Administration. 
New Guidelines would modernize the analysis. They would clarify the ana-
lytic methodology and summarize “best practices” with respect to analytics and 
types of relevant evidence.
88
 They would identify the various types of documen-
tary and economic evidence of competitive effects. They also would analyze a 
variety of policy issues, including: determination of any structural near-safe har-
bors and anticompetitive presumptions, whether a showing of higher prices to 
unintegrated downstream competitors would be sufficient for liability or 
whether it would also be necessary to show likely harm to customers of the 
downstream competitors, the timing of enforcement, and the role of concerns 
about future vertical mergers that might occur in response to the merger under 
consideration. 
 
85. James Langenfeld, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the United States and the European Com-
mission: Time for the United States To Catch Up?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 851, 851-52 (2009) 
(arguing that the 1984 Guidelines need to reﬂect advances in economics and current policy); 
Sallet, supra note 15, at 1 (explaining that the mechanisms of harm are substantially broader 
than what the 1984 Guidelines express); Presidential Transition Report: The State of Antitrust 
Enforcement, A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 7-8 (Jan. 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/state_of_antitrust_enforcement.authcheckdam.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/28TQ-YNDZ] (recommending revision); Presidential Transition Report: 
The State of Antitrust Enforcement 2012, A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 7 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter 
ABA 2012 Transition Report], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/antitrust_law/at_comments_presidential_201302.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc
/H7SM-DHU4] (same); Report and Recommendations, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMIS-
SION 68 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter AMC Report], http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report
_recommendation/amc_ﬁnal_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/4253-W39V] (addressing the fail-
ure to update guidelines); cf. EC Guidelines, supra note 51 (providing a more modern analysis 
of input and customer foreclosure). 
86. See, e.g., Deborah L. Feinstein, Are the Vertical Merger Guidelines Ripe for Revision?, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 2010, at 5; Scheffman & Higgins, supra note 17. Feinstein subsequently became the 
Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition. Deborah L. Feinstein, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/deborah-l-feinstein [http://perma.cc/2N9Y 
-PN7W]. David Scheffman was the Director of the FTC Bureau of Economics in 2001-2003. 
For another articulation of the argument against the adoption of new guidelines, see Yde, 
supra note 9. 
87. AMC Report, supra note 85, at 68. By contrast, Commissioner Donald G. Kempf, Jr., the cur-
rent DOJ Deputy AAG for Litigation, dissented from that recommendation. Id. 
88. For a complementary, earlier analysis of this and other issues that would arise in drafting new 
guidelines, and discussion of the type of evidence that would be relevant for evaluating vertical 
mergers, see Salop & Culley, Interim Guide, supra note 10. 
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Revised Guidelines and the law should incorporate modern economic anal-
ysis. The Guidelines could state clearly that enforcement policy is based on the 
understanding that foreclosure concerns are real, the single monopoly proﬁt the-
ory is invalid except under the most limited speciﬁc conditions, and EDM ben-
eﬁts are neither inevitable nor presumptively more signiﬁcant than potential 
competitive harms. Enforcement should pay special attention to acquisitions by 
leading ﬁrms, particularly in oligopoly or dominant ﬁrm markets subject to net-
work effects or economies of scale. This would include acquisitions of ﬁrms that 
may become signiﬁcant potential competitors. The agencies also should pay at-
tention to the limitations of behavioral remedies. 
Guidelines are not law. Courts have the key role of reviewing the standards 
embedded in the Guidelines in litigated cases.
89
 Therefore, the courts have the 
ability to convert the analysis and any enforcement presumptions in the Guide-
lines into legal standards or reject or revise them.
90
 In this way, judicial outcomes 
affect future enforcement guidelines. Hearing from a district court and perhaps 
also the D.C. Circuit might be an important effect of the AT&T-Time Warner 
litigation. 
A. The Requisite Showing of Anticompetitive-Effects Harm Under Section 7 
An initial question for agencies and courts is what showing of anticompeti-
tive effects is required under Section 7. It is clear that Section 7 requires evidence 
of likely anticompetitive effects, not just foreclosure or harm to competitors.
91
 
Section 7 calls for a prediction, and the “incipiency” standard reduces the burden 




89. See sources cited supra note 84. 
90. The role of the courts may be very limited if the agencies set overly permissive enforcement 
standards and fail to challenge and litigate any cases. Challenges by state attorneys general 
might ﬁll the enforcement gap. And if there is a DOJ consent decree, Tunney Act oversight 
provides at least a limited role for the courts. For discussion of the Tunney Act, see Joseph G. 
Krauss et al., The Tunney Act: A House Still Standing, ANTITRUST SOURCE (June 2007), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun07_Krauss6
_20f.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6D5-CAUM]. 
91. On anticompetitive-effects requirements, see Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352-53 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
92. These incipiency concerns are reﬂected in the language that the merger “may” substantially 
lessen competition, which involves probabilities, not certainties. See Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). As subsequently explained in Philadelphia National 
Bank, merger analysis “requires not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger 
upon competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future; 
this is what is meant when it is said that the amended §7 was intended to arrest anticompeti-
tive tendencies in their ‘incipiency.’” United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) 
(citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317, 346). 
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Incipiency also places weight on concerns about the potential effects from sub-
sequent mergers in response to this one.
93
 Substantiality in principle might be 
gauged in terms of the likely dollar reduction in effective consumer welfare from 
higher prices, reduced quality, and slowed innovation. However, as a practical 
matter, dollar measures generally can only be predicted for some price effects and 
only very roughly. Thus, qualitative predictions of likely effects will normally be 
given substantial weight. 
One key legal and policy issue raised here is whether it should be sufficient 
for the government just to prove likely higher prices or other injury to the cus-
tomers of the upstream ﬁrms (i.e., the unintegrated downstream competitors) 
or whether it is also necessary to show harm to the customers of the downstream 
competitors. Focusing for simplicity on prices, a potential conﬂict can arise be-
cause a vertical merger that leads to higher upstream (input) prices may be prof-
itable even absent higher downstream output prices or efficiencies.
94
 
Attempting to resolve this issue is beyond the scope of this Feature but it will 
set out the knotty issues. Consider the case of input foreclosure. On the one 
hand, a court might conclude the antitrust laws are designed to protect consum-
ers, not competitors, and that downstream ﬁrms should be viewed simply as 
competitors, whereas the customers of these downstream ﬁrms should be 
viewed as the consumers. On the other hand, a court might hold it to be suffi-
cient to show likely higher prices charged to the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, 
who are the direct purchasers. This latter impact could be said to disrupt com-
petition on the merits. Moreover, if the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms face 
higher costs, these higher costs generally will be passed on to their customers to 
some degree, unless there is a high degree of downstream competition from non-
foreclosed competitors that are sufficiently close substitutes. 
If evidence of higher prices charged to the downstream ﬁrms (or other harm) 
is deemed sufficient for liability, it raises a question of how merger efficiencies 
that beneﬁt customers of the downstream merging ﬁrm would be taken into ac-
count. Which effect would determine the ruling—the lower price to these cus-
tomers of the downstream ﬁrms or the higher price paid by the direct purchasers 
(who also are the rivals of the downstream merging ﬁrm)? Section 7 refers to 
anticompetitive effects in any line of commerce.
95
 The Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines similarly make it clear that a horizontal merger violates Section 7 if it creates 
anticompetitive effects in any relevant market, which normally involves direct 
 
93. In the context of vertical mergers, Brown Shoe also referred to a “trend towards vertical inte-
gration.” 370 U.S. at 332-33. 
94. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not require showing harm to consumers in the case of 
buy-side harm to upstream sellers. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra 
note 42, at 32-33. 
95. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 




 In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court rejected the view that a 
horizontal merger that harms direct customers in one relevant market might be 
justiﬁed by beneﬁts to other customers in another relevant market.
97
 But merger 
law also stresses that its goal is “the protection of competition, not competi-
tors.”
98
 This suggests some possible ambiguity that courts will ultimately have 
to resolve in that the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms are the direct customers 
but also are the competitors of the downstream merging ﬁrm. 
Rather than a uniform standard, one possible resolution could make the legal 
outcome depend on the mechanism of the harm. If the merger facilitates up-
stream coordination, then harm to the downstream customers and disruption to 
competition from that coordination might be found to be sufficient to ﬁnd lia-
bility. But, if coordination is unlikely, then it would be necessary to show harm 
to these customers of the downstream ﬁrms. 
Another possible resolution would be to use a burden-shifting rule of reason 
whereby evidence of likely higher prices charged to these downstream rival ﬁrms 
is sufficient to shift the burden to the merging parties to produce evidence of 
likely merger-speciﬁc beneﬁts. If the parties carry this burden, then the burden 
would shift back to the plaintiff to show anticompetitive effects on balance to the 
customers of the downstream ﬁrms. 
This legal ambiguity is not unique to vertical mergers. Suppose that a hori-
zontal merger increases the ﬁrm’s bargaining power over input suppliers, which 
permits it to obtain lower input prices. If this bargaining power amounts to clas-
sical monopsony, it would lead to harm to downstream customers as well as re-
duced market output, ceteris paribus. However, if the increased bargaining power 
does not amount to classical monopsony, but rather involves countervailing bar-
gaining power over oligopolistic input suppliers, then the input price increase 
would not automatically lead to reduced market output.
99
  The downstream 
merging ﬁrm might have the incentive to pass on some of the cost savings to its 
customers, ceteris paribus. This raises the question of whether the court would 





96. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 42, at 30 n.14. 
97. 374 U.S. at 370-71. 
98. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320 (emphasis omitted). 
99. The lower prices could reduce the input suppliers’ incentives to invest, but the same argument 
would suggest that the lower costs could raise the merged ﬁrm’s incentives to invest. For fur-
ther discussion of these issues, see C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm 
Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078 (2018). 
100. This issue was potentially raised by the Anthem-Cigna merger, see supra note 80 and accom-
panying text, but the court was skeptical of the cost savings and whether they would be passed 
on. 
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In summary, the issue of whether it should be necessary for liability to prove 
harm to the customers of the downstream ﬁrms, or whether it should be suffi-
cient to prove only harm to the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, is still unre-
solved. This is a key issue for guidelines and the courts. 
B. Presumptions 
A second question for courts and enforcement guidelines is whether or not 
to adopt anticompetitive or procompetitive presumptions.
101
 In the view of this 
author, vertical merger law and enforcement policy should not presume that the 
typical vertical merger in an oligopoly market is inherently anticompetitive. Nei-
ther should the agencies nor the law adopt the outdated Chicago School view 
that presumes that foreclosure concerns are inherently unlikely or that efficiency 
beneﬁts can be presumed to be highly likely to prevent anticompetitive effects 
on consumers in situations where the merger otherwise raises competitive con-
cerns.
102
  That presumption is not supported by Section 7’s basic incipiency 
standard or Ford and Fruehauf. Nor is it supported by theoretical and empirical 
economic analysis.
103
 That permissible presumption would lead to false negative 
errors and underdeterrence. 
 
101. For general analysis of the structure and role of antitrust presumptions, see Steven C. Salop, 
An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formu-
lating Antitrust Legal Standards (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Nov. 6, 2017), http://ssrn.com
/abstract_id=3068157 [http://perma.cc/KAA4-496S]. For the application to horizontal mer-
gers, see Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision- 
Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269 (2015). 
102. See supra Section I.D. By contrast, the FTC’s 2007 submission to the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development recommended a very permissive standard that vertical 
mergers “should be allowed to proceed except in those few cases where convincing, fact-based 
evidence relating to the speciﬁc circumstances of the vertical merger indicates likely competi-
tive harm.” Note by the United States, supra note 13, ¶ 1. 
103. In his recent speech, Bruce Hoffman argued that empirical studies suggest that vertical re-
straints generally are procompetitive. See Hoffman, supra note 32, at 4. Yet he failed to take 
into account a number of recent empirical studies, including a number of merger natural ex-
periments that more often ﬁnd anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers or lack of vertical 
merger efficiencies. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 75, at 306 (offering evidence of anticom-
petitive input foreclosure in that the partial vertical merger of News Corp and DIRECTV led 
to higher prices for Fox (News Corp) content charged to rivals of DIRECTV); Justine S. 
Hastings & Richard J. Gilbert, Market Power, Vertical Integration and the Wholesale Price of Gas-
oline, 53 J. INDUS. ECON. 469 (2005) (offering evidence consistent with vertical integration 
leading to higher wholesale prices charged to competitors); Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, 
Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices, 115 J. POL. 
ECON. 250 (2007) (concluding that vertical integration did not lead to higher prices, but also 
rejecting vertical integration efficiencies); Jean-François Houde, Spatial Differentiation and 
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Vertical mergers can lead to efficiency beneﬁts that can prevent or mitigate 
consumer harms. But, as with horizontal mergers, some or all of these efficien-
cies (including EDM) might be obtained without a merger. Substantial effi-
ciency beneﬁts also are not inevitable. Beneﬁts accruing to the merging ﬁrms 
also may come at the expense of reduced efficiencies for the unintegrated rivals 
from loss of access to critical inputs or higher input prices. Other upstream ﬁrms 
might raise their prices in response to input foreclosure, which would tend to 
lead to higher downstream prices. Increased cooperation between the divisions 
of the merging ﬁrm often would be accompanied by less cooperation between 
the merging ﬁrm and its rivals.
104
 As a result, it cannot be presumed that prices 
 
Vertical Mergers in Retail Markets for Gasoline, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2147 (2012) (offering evi-
dence that an increase in the number of vertically integrated gas stations in Quebec City led 
to higher prices); Leemore Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2017) (offering evidence that mergers 
of complementary hospitals with common customers led to higher prices, a result also incon-
sistent with the single monopoly proﬁt theory), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22106 
[http://perma.cc/AFX6-UR63]; Fernando Luco & Guillermo Marshall, Vertical Integration 
with Multi-Product Firms: When Eliminating Double Marginalization May Hurt Consumers 
15 (Oct. 20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents
/public_events/1208143/luco_marshall.pdf [http://perma.cc/85VZ-4FY4] (offering evi-
dence that Coca-Cola and PepsiCo bottler acquisitions raised prices of Dr. Pepper Snapple 
products, while reducing prices of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo products). But see Gregory S. 
Crawford et al., The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21832, 2017) (offering evidence that ver-
tical integration of cable TV distributors with regional sports networks generally led to lower 
prices), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21832 [http://perma.cc/3L7J-9TCS]. Hoffman, supra 
note 32, at 4 n.6, cites two earlier survey articles that purported to ﬁnd little evidence of harms 
from vertical mergers: James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 
23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005); and Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Con-
tracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 391. Some of the limited number of vertical merger studies sur-
veyed in these articles were stock market event studies, which do not account for the possible 
effects of investors’ expectations that competitors also will be acquired in subsequent mergers, 
among other problems. Almost half of the other vertical merger articles involved markets 
where vertical integration was prohibited by state laws intended mainly to beneﬁt retailers, 
which limit their value in forming presumptions about markets where vertical mergers might 
be used to maintain or enhance market power. The two most relevant studies in those surveys 
involved vertical integration by video distributors into content. But these studies limited their 
analysis solely to the issue of customer foreclosure. They did not analyze the input foreclosure 
concerns that have been raised in recent matters, were validated in Baker et al., supra note 75, 
and now are the focus of the AT&T-Time Warner complaint. More generally, Jonathan Baker 
elsewhere has made the point that it is important to take into account whether econometric 
studies of allegedly anticompetitive conduct provide biased evidence about the effects of loos-
ening antitrust rules if more intrusive current antitrust rules deter exclusionary conduct in the 
most problematic markets. See Baker, supra note 27, at 17-26. 
104. This was an issue in the Google-ITA merger. Competitive Impact Statement at 6-9, United 
States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Google-ITA CIS], 
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would fall, the speed of innovation would increase, or consumers would beneﬁt 
on balance. 
Legal and enforcement presumptions might depend on market-structure 
factors. For example, the existence of substantial economies of scale and de-
mand-side network effects can lead to severe incumbency advantages, high bar-
riers to entry, and incentives to use vertical mergers to decrease the likelihood of 
entry.
105
 If, in addition, the incumbent has the ability and incentive to integrate 
de novo, the cost of false positives falls, relative to false negatives. Where the 
acquisition target is small or nascent, and the potential harms will occur in the 
future, it also may be more difficult to make a precise prediction with case- 
speciﬁc evidence. In light of the incipiency standard, these observations suggest 
there might be a modest anticompetitive presumption for mergers involving 
dominant ﬁrms in markets with signiﬁcant scale economies or network ef-
fects.
106
 By contrast, there might be a procompetitive presumption for vertical 
mergers involving ﬁrms with low market shares. But for the remaining markets, 
a neutral competitive-effects presumption might be warranted. 
C. Near-Safe Harbors 
A third question for courts and enforcement guidelines is whether or not to 
adopt any safe harbors. A vertical merger does not change concentration in either 
market. However, market shares and concentration measures can be relevant to 
the competitive evaluation and might be used to create near-safe harbors.
107
 For 
example, the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines had a safe harbor for mar-





-K72F]. Similarly, in the proposed Lam-KLA merger, the merged KLA might have gained the 
incentive to delay access for Lam’s rivals. As explained by the Acting AAG for Antitrust, “The 
proposed transaction presented concerns about the ability of the merged ﬁrm to foreclose 
competitors’ development of leading edge fabrication tools and process technology on a 
timely basis.” Don Clark & Ezequiel Minaya, Lam Research, KLA-Tencor Call Off Merger on 
Antitrust Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2016, 8:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lam 
-research-kla-tenor-call-off-merger-on-antitrust-concerns-1475707330 [http://perma.cc
/7CHK-M22Q]. 
105. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching 
Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 17, at 1967. 
Posner also expresses greater concerns with exclusion in these “new economy” markets. POS-
NER 2d ed., supra note 1, at 252-55. 
106. For a far more interventionist policy suggestion, see Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust 
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 792-97 (2017). 
107. A near-safe harbor is one that normally is followed but might be ignored in special circum-
stances. 
108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 26. 
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Courts and agencies should be cautious about adopting near-safe harbors 
based purely on market shares and concentration. The upstream merging ﬁrm 
may have a relatively small market share, but its own premerger ability and in-
centive to rapidly expand or engage in maverick behavior may be disciplining 
the pricing of other upstream ﬁrms. In this scenario, the merger might lead to 
proﬁtable input foreclosure by permitting the other upstream ﬁrms to raise their 
prices and disadvantage its downstream rivals. Similarly, a low market share of 
the downstream merging ﬁrm may not be a good proxy for its premerger role as 
a disruptive buyer or downstream maverick.
109
 
However, the agencies might consider a possible near-safe harbor if both 
markets are unconcentrated, and if concentration also would be low for a modi-
ﬁed measure of concentration, where the merging ﬁrms are excluded from the 
concentration calculation.
110
 The latter calculation is needed to take into account 
the incentives of nonmerging ﬁrms to respond to foreclosure by raising their 
own prices. 
D. Treatment of Complementary Product Mergers 
A fourth consideration is the treatment of mergers of ﬁrms producing com-
plementary products. These mergers are analytically identical to vertical mer-
gers.
111
 Evaluation of complementary product mergers uses the same economic 
tools as vertical mergers.
112





109. This same point applies to anticompetitive presumptions based solely on market shares and 
concentration. The upstream merging ﬁrm may currently have a large market share, but nu-
merous other actual and potential competitors may have the ability and incentive to expand 
rapidly if it forecloses downstream rivals, which can render unproﬁtable an attempted input 
foreclosure strategy. 
110. Salop & Culley, Interim Guide, supra note 10 at 14-15. 
111. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical merger between a product designer and a product fabri-
cator. For example, the fabricator might purchase a design and then sell the product to cus-
tomers, or vice versa, in which case the merger would appear vertical. Or, the market may be 
structured such that the customer contracts with each company separately for the design and 
fabrication services, in which case the merger will appear complementary. 
112. One seeming difference is that some customers may purchase only one of the complementary 
components. However, this also can occur in the vertical merger context. For example, electrically 
powered automobiles do not use fuel injectors or spark plugs. 
113. The potential competitive harms discussed here should be distinguished from the entrench-
ment theory in complementary product mergers. Under that theory, the efficiencies from the 
transaction might lead a more efficient merged ﬁrm to capture sales from its rivals sufficient 
to cause those rivals to exit. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Note, 
however, that a merger alternatively can entrench market power by raising the costs of com-
petitors and entrants. 
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A few issues may be described differently or present themselves with super-
ﬁcially different conduct. A complementary product merger may lead to in-
creased prices for unbundled purchases, which the merging ﬁrms may charac-
terize as a bundled discount but may really be a bundled surcharge, relative to 
premerger prices. Total foreclosure of one product may present as a refusal to 
sell the products unbundled, which might be implemented though physical or 
contractual tying. Or, the merged ﬁrm might make its products incompatible 
with potential entrants’ products. However, the basic economic analysis is the 
same. 
E. Timing of Enforcement 
A ﬁfth consideration for agencies and ultimately for courts is the timing of 
enforcement. It has been suggested by some that enforcement policy towards 
vertical (or complementary product) mergers should be delayed unless and until 
the merged ﬁrm engages in anticompetitive conduct.
114
 The rationale is that the 
ﬁrm may never attempt exclusionary conduct and the unnecessary remedy may 
create inefficiencies. 
There are several ﬂaws in such a policy of delay.
115
 First, consumers would 
suffer harms during the interim until liability has been established and a remedy 
put into place. The ability of the merged ﬁrm to delay resolution of the matter 
could entail a long lag before the anticompetitive effects are remedied. Second, 
if enforcement is delayed, it may be impossible to unwind the merger after the 
fact. The market structure also may have irreversibly changed. For example, the 
exclusionary conduct of the merged ﬁrm may already have caused excluded rivals 
irreversibly to exit, in which case the only remaining remedy might be price reg-
ulation. Third, the anticompetitive conduct may not even be reliably detected 
after-the-fact, just as coordination may not be detected after a horizontal merger. 
Fourth, Section 1 and Section 2 standards are more permissive than Section 7. All 
in all, failure to address these kinds of issues in the context of premerger review 
could lead to signiﬁcant consumer harm and underdeterrence. 
 
114. See ABA 2012 Transition Report, supra note 85, at 8-9. 
115. Indeed, the fundamental rationale for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is to prevent the delays and 
limitations inherent in after-the-fact enforcement of Section 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). 
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F. Remedies for Anticompetitive Vertical Mergers 
A sixth consideration relates to remedies. Most vertical merger consent de-
crees have mandated behavioral (conduct) remedies.
116
 This reﬂects conﬁdence 
that these restrictions can prevent competitive harm while allowing the ﬁrms to 
achieve efficiency beneﬁts that will increase competition. This conﬁdence is 
sorely misplaced. Consider the general point: a conduct remedy represents an 
acknowledgement that the merger likely creates incentives to behave in ways that will 
harm competition. It also represents a belief that the agency has identified and suc-
cessfully enumerated all the behaviors that might manifest those incentives in the fu-
ture. But as regulatory economics has made clear, regulated firms surely are better 
informed about how various actions might allow them to exercise their market 
power.
117
 Moreover, the options for anticompetitive behavior likely will evolve over 
time as market conditions change. Despite this dynamic context and fundamental 
information asymmetry, consent decrees today also are typically short-lived with little 
room for modification.
118
 This short duration may be based on the view that markets 
will self-correct over the life of the decree or that certain provisions will outlive their 
usefulness.
 
But market self-correction may not occur, and the consent decree provi-
sions may fail to achieve their goal of preserving competition. It follows that rational 
and effective consent decrees should permit the agencies and courts to monitor the 
market and modify the decree if conditions change that make the specific provisions 
of the decree ineffective in preserving competition. 
While these problems with behavioral remedies have generally been 
acknowledged in the case of horizontal mergers, where structural relief is gener-
 
116. Keyte & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 10, 12-15; Salop & Culley, Enforcement Actions, supra note 
10. 
117. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND 
REGULATION (1993). 
118. For example, the consent decree for the Google-ITA merger required that Google provide key 
products for at least ﬁve years. Google-ITA CIS, supra note 104, at 9-10. The Comcast-NBCU 
consent decree expires in September 2018. United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106, 
2011 WL 5402137, at *17 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011). 
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ally required, they have tended to be ignored or downplayed in vertical transac-
tions.
119
 The current DOJ AAG has taken a strong stand against behavioral rem-
edies.
120
 Remedies such as ﬁrewalls, exclusion prohibitions, and antidiscrimina-
tion provisions have loopholes and may be unable to be effectively enforced by 
the agencies or a court. Antidiscrimination provisions such as MFNs can create 
their own competitive problems.
121
 
For these reasons, structural relief, such as divestitures of the critical prod-
ucts that raise foreclosure concerns, divestitures sufficient to eliminate 
postmerger market power concerns, or paid-up licenses for critical intellectual 
property, should generally be required. In some situations, it will be necessary to 
enjoin the merger. It also is important to incorporate a process for postmerger 
competitive reviews that provide the agencies with an opportunity to signiﬁ-
cantly alter consent decrees if necessary to ensure competitive performance.
122
 
While such provisions will place ﬁnancial risk on the merging parties, that is 
preferable to putting all the competitive risk on consumers. Requiring the merg-
ing ﬁrms to bear this risk will also help to deter overreaching claims. 
The courts have an important role in remedial design. In litigated cases 
where the merging ﬁrms commit to a remedy as part of their merger defense, 
courts can take a skeptical view of behavioral remedies. Additionally, courts can 
 
119. The DOJ’s remedy policy guide states that “[r]emedial provisions that are too vague to be 
enforced, or that can easily be misconstrued or evaded, fall short of their intended purpose 
and may leave the competitive harm unchecked.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION 
POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 13 (June 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf [http://perma.cc/6AFQ-LKAJ]. For example, Luco 
& Marshall, supra note 103, found that the FTC’s behavioral remedy failed to prevent price 
increases for the rival brands bottled by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. 
120. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at American 
Bar Association’s Antitrust Fall Forum (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynote-address-american-bar 
[http://perma.cc/Y6V6-FT47]. This author agrees with his concerns. See Steven Salop, 
Blocking the AT&T-Time Warner Merger Is Good Antitrust Economics and Law, MEDIUM (Nov. 
21, 2017), http://medium.com/@PublicKnowledge/blocking-the-at-t-time-warner-merger 
-is-good-antitrust-economics-and-law-1845f07ed586 [http://perma.cc/6JT3-GQC9]. For 
example, some consent decrees mandate a binding arbitration remedy for alleged anticompet-
itive price increases by the merged ﬁrm. E.g., Google-ITA CIS, supra note 104. That remedy 
likely would fail because commercial arbitrators are unequipped to determine whether such 
price increases are competitively unreasonable under the antitrust rule of reason. They can 
evaluate only whether price increases are “commercially reasonable,” a standard that permits 
a ﬁrm with additional bargaining power to charge higher prices. 
121. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Developing an Administrable MFN Enforcement 
Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 15. 
122. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Modifying Merger Consent Decrees: An Economist Plot To Improve Mer-
ger Enforcement Policy, ANTITRUST, Fall 2016, at 15. 
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reject merger settlements with weak remedies and demand a role for judicial 
oversight and a broader scope for modiﬁcation of consent decrees. 
conclusion 
The view that vertical mergers are invariably efficient and procompetitive is 
a vestige of the Chicago School’s outdated economic analysis of exclusionary 
conduct. In the current economy where market power is more common and con-
centration is high in many signiﬁcant markets, and where technology has led to 
substantial technological and network-effects entry barriers, vertical and com-
plementary product mergers present heightened concerns. It is time to address 
these concerns and invigorate vertical merger enforcement to protect a vibrant 
competitive process, innovation, and consumer welfare. 
 
